To combat corruption.

“Any problem, no matter how complex, always has a simple, easy-to-understand, wrong solution.” Murphy’s Laws.

How can weto arrange the scatteringto defeat corruption?

How so? There is a simple and obvious solution – the death penalty for corrupt officials ! Just like in China! That’s it. The question is closed. Really?

However, any problem exists precisely because there is no simple and easy-to-understand solution for it. If such a solution existed, the problem would have been resolved long ago. Often, we perceive a problem merely as a symptom, and fighting it can only worsen the situation rather than address the deeper issue that requires more nuanced thinking to understand.

We all hear about yet another corrupt official being caught in China, with a stash of gold and diamonds found in their basement. Of course, they will likely be executed (probably). However, behind this news lie several unpleasant facts:

• The existence of the death penalty did not stop this person from poisoning society for years, and a firing squad won’t undo what has already been done. The chemical plant has already killed all living things around it, and the suppliers have long sold the goods that were smuggled in.
• The very fact that a corrupt official has been caught means there are others out there to catch. Corrupt individuals exist and continue to operate (probably).
• And the most important thing is that increasing the severity of punishment is nothing more than raising the stakes in the game, rather than ending the game itself. This means it stimulates the growth of bribery.
• The repeated use of the word “probably” hints that, in today’s conditions of transaction anonymization (bitcoins, hidden treasures) and the codification of laws (not the official, but his cousin’s matchmaker), it often means that there is no one to shoot, despite the countless gold in the basement. One could also act like in Japan, offering a position or paying for the publication of memoirs at an outrageous price after the official has retired. This brings to mind Chancellor Schröder, who successfully closed all nuclear power plants in Germany under the pretext of being “green,” and then, of course by coincidence, became a member of the board of Gazprom.

Good news might look like this: In Nagonia, despite the existence of a death penalty for bribery, no official has been caught taking bribes in the last 50 years. Stressed and undernourished officials went on strike, demanding milk for their hazardous work. But there’s no such news. This means that the punishment isn’t working as it was supposedly intended. Sigh, do I have to keep reading? Yes. I have to.

Categories.

A person, to ease their thinking, resorts to categories , mentally drawing boundaries where there are none. The boundaries exist in our minds, and it’s good when everyone’s perception of these boundaries is the same. The boundaries of categories, just like the boundaries of states, depend solely on personal perception and do not exist in reality. Whose Crimea is it? Is turquoise green or blue? And what about this ambiguous thing, is it a chair or a table? Even in seemingly deterministic matters like sex (gender), where one could judge by the presence or absence of the Y chromosome, there are nuances. For example, there are unfortunate mutations where a person is genetically male, but their body does not respond to testosterone. This testosterone is produced in crazy amounts, yet physiologically, they develop as a woman, with breasts, a vagina, no beard, and weak musculature. This may only become apparent, for instance, after a series of unsuccessful attempts to conceive.

Considering that criminal law deals with categories such as intentional, unintentional, premeditated, spontaneous, in collusion, alone, in a group, with aggravating factors, with mitigating factors, in large amounts, in small amounts — essentially a whole zoo of terms designed to mask what the laws really are: just words on paper, we won’t even be able to provide a flawless definition of bribery.

Yes, giving money to a police officer while they are on duty is definitely a bribe. By the way, a well-tuned mind looking for loopholes in the system could already come up with a number of counterexamples to this statement. But:

• Is a police officer’s biased favoritism towards their friends a form of corruption? “It’s who you know” (c) from the film “Beware of the Car.”
• Or in general, can biases themselves be a sign of corruption? “I trust Protestants more than Muslims” or “I worked with this company before and they didn’t let me down.” “I know this person personally; we go fishing and to the sauna together—he won’t let me down.”
• Is it a fact of corruption if an official performs their duties by providing someone with administrative services fully within the law, but out of turn or with greater willingness, and does not receive any reward for it other than gratitude and the resulting sense of obligation?
• Is the laziness of a bureaucrat who closes the office doors in front of a visitor 15 minutes before closing considered corruption?
• Is it considered corruption when an official exerts manipulative pressure on their colleagues, including members of the tender commission, with the aim of awarding a contract to a specific contractor? Just a couple of throwaway lines like, “By the way, Rabinovich’s daughter is a prostitute.”
• Or to put it more intricately, is it considered a bribe if someone accepts money for assistance in winning a tender, with a guarantee of refunding it in case of failure and with no actual influence on the tender results? In other words, if they take the money, the tender is won – they keep the money. If it’s not won – they return it. But they didn’t do anything.
• Should every gift to a person providing administrative services be perceived as an attempt to influence their actions, again without any specific obligations, but with the aim of fostering a sense of gratitude and indebtedness?
• Is the behavior of an official who was appointed to their position by a mobster considered corruption if they have never received a bribe, but all the tenders are won by a contractor also connected to the mobster? In this case, bribes are not even necessary. It’s enough to simply love and fear losing your family.
• By the way, speaking of forced corruption, a perfect example is collusion. When you feel compelled to commit crimes simply because everyone around you is doing it, and they won’t trust you if you remain clean, ultimately setting you up despite your honesty. Just stand up and walk away? Sure, but first you need to talk to your wife, kids, mistress, and mortgage. They might have a few objections.
• There is also the phenomenon of systemic corruption, where a position is bought in order to later recoup the investment and make a profit while holding that position. In other words, it is pointless to try to convince such a person not to take bribes. This goes against the rules of the game that were established earlier.

Conclusion. Legislative measures cannot eliminate corruption due to, at the very least, the vagueness of category boundaries. But that’s not all.

“Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent.”

Salvor Hardin, “Foundation,” A. Asimov.

Punishment.

The formula for an ideal criminal law looks like a combination of an event that has a low probability of being discovered or proven, and a sanction. For example: whistling in the street – a fine of 500 ducats. Already sensing some awkwardness in the categorical nature of this (what constitutes whistling, what defines a street, is this applicable to everyone or just to certain individuals, etc.), we will now discuss the second part of any law – sanctions. The perceptive reader already understands that the idea of sanctions will soon be dismantled, and that the very concept of combating corruption with modern methods is devoid of meaning, but allow me to elaborate on this.

Sanctions have two aspects: the gaming aspect and the social aspect. I already mentioned the gaming aspect above: the higher the sanctions, the higher the stakes in the game. It works like this: the profit from the crime must always be greater than the monetary equivalent of the sanctions multiplied by the risk of getting caught.

W > R * S, where W is the gain, R is the risk, and S is the sanctions.

The fine for riding without a ticket is higher the less frequently one encounters a controller. The price of the fine starts to equal the price of a ticket when it becomes impossible to avoid fare inspection. At that point, the inspector is referred to as a “conductor.” In the case of executions, the penalty seems to be infinite, and the risk of being caught can be as small as one wishes. Ignoring the fact that the game is not necessarily the same and that executions can be used for retribution or blackmail through crime fabrication, provocation, crime documentation, false reporting, etc., one could say that the formula R*S loses its mathematical meaning, as it turns into R*∞=∞. In real life, this leads to the state not making efforts to increase the risk (the outcome of the formula (W →∞) remains valid at any risk, so why bother). It turns out that theft is rampant, but executing a specific individual would be unjust, as it is called “selective justice.” Russian speakers should be made aware that in other languages, justice and fairness are typically described by the same word. In other words, “selective” justice is somewhat of an oxymoron. Justice, in the minds of people, should be universal and not dependent on the individual. Yes, people are executed. But not for stealing, rather for going against the system, for trying to break free from the bonds of mutual complicity, for not listening to the boss, for not sharing their winnings, which are very large, W →∞, and so on. Thus, in addition to laws, we also have “concepts,” and the state, despite exercising its monopoly on violence, becomes a puppet in the hands of other forces that, in fact, strip the state of this monopoly and form their own state within a state. What they fought for is what they ended up with.

At the same time, punishment or sanctions are cultural phenomena aimed at satisfying the sense of justice. Punishment does not significantly influence a criminal’s behavior. No murderer reads the criminal code and checks how best to kill their victim. Punishment does not affect the compensation for damages. Execution or imprisonment will not bring back the dead or compensate for what has been destroyed. Moreover, the sense of justice is merely a feeling, an emotion that varies from person to person. It is the illusion that justice is an objective category that has led the greatest minds to search for and fail to find its definition. To see how subjective justice is, try to come up with a fair system for charging for elevator rides in your building. Equal for everyone? But people go to different floors. Proportional to the floors? But some have guests visiting. Issue cards and record trips? But some don’t use it at all and don’t want to pay even fixed costs. And so on.

And if punishment serves only to satisfy a sense of justice, then any court is nothing more than a theater, a spectacle to please the crowd. A source of emotions. Society uses punishment not as a means to prevent crimes, but as a means of communication and self-expression. Like a small child, if you ask them to show with their hands how upset they are (by the way, this helps during children’s tantrums), they will spread their arms wide. This is natural. People have been raised this way, being punished for their misdeeds. They live in a society that evaluates the degree of disapproval of a wrongdoing “scientifically,” in numbers: “from 8 to 15 with confiscation.” And we find this appropriate and just. Let’s rewind history 500 years and recall some archaic legal systems. For example, it was considered normal to take revenge on the owner of a donkey if that donkey, when rented or even stolen, threw off its rider or even killed him with a kick. How would you feel about applying such a norm today, say, suing a leasing company because a leased excavator hit a power line and killed the driver? Ridiculous, absurd? Well, punishing is also absurd. Neither fines nor prison solve the main issues in society: eliminating consequences, genuine remorse, and preventing future offenses. The primary purpose of punishment is emotional demonstration, and that’s it! After all, punishment:

• focuses the punished individual on avoiding punishment next time, rather than on not committing the offense.
• It breeds resentment, and a person starts to fantasize about revenge plans. There can be no talk of loyalty to society anymore;
• neither inspires trust nor respect, neither the punished nor the punisher;
• creates an antagonistic hostile environment
• It doesn’t make one think about the redemption of a wrongdoing. On the contrary, the punished individual believes that since they have been punished, they have paid for their misdeed and no longer feel remorse. In other words, they have paid and are free to repeat the offense.
• It does not suppress violence, but rather condones it by demonstrating a “model” of socially acceptable behavior.
• The severity of the punishment does not give the punished person an understanding of the magnitude of the offense and the scale of the consequences.
• The tradition of punishing with imprisonment leads to an increase in the number of repeat offenders, criminals who operate in groups and collude with one another, criminals who share useful experiences and ideas among themselves—criminals, criminals, criminals, but not honest people. A person who becomes honest after prison is a beautiful, albeit rare, exception. No HR manager will hire an ex-convict for a responsible position, and everyone understands this. So, even if you suddenly become honest, society will not provide you with a way to reintegrate into it honestly.
• The cost of applying sanctions is often higher than the damage caused by the offense. How much does it cost to keep an inmate, and what are the reasons for sentencing someone to a couple of years? Not to mention the enormous expenses involved in capturing, processing, and trying the case. Now imagine if all this bureaucracy were outsourced to some PwC. How much would that cost per hour? It would be that much, if not more, since the “service provider” is a monopoly. Yet we don’t notice this money being spent. We pay our taxes and sleep soundly. Like fools.

One might assume that punishment serves a deterrent function. The idea is that if we punish one person, others will be scared. A quick counterexample is motorcyclists. The highly probable risk of a fatal accident on the road doesn’t stop them; in fact, they often think, “That won’t happen to me.” This is a typical cognitive distortion among teenagers and young adults, who have little experience with failure and are evolutionarily inclined to underestimate risks. They think, “I’m not that stupid,” and so on. Interestingly, the graphic images on cigarette packages have been found to actually stimulate tobacco consumption. But even if we assume that punishment has a deterrent effect, in the case of corruption, the benefits of this are questionable:

• Since the public broadcasting of the details and motives behind a wrongdoing and its punishment often plants new, undesirable ideas in the minds of society’s members—ideas they might not have even considered before—people might think, “Oh, is that allowed?”
• The recognition of corruption undermines the foundations of governmental legitimacy, as people tolerate authority believing it to be just.
• The concealment of corruption facts and secret punishment deprives punishment of its deterrent effect.

If the state were made up entirely of good people, everyone would probably be arguing with each other about the possibility of stepping back from governance, just as they currently contest power.

Socrates

Where did the officials come from?

There is a house in the historic center of Prague. The house was built behind forests and a high fence. When it was completed and everyone saw that it extended beyond the “red line,” it was already too late to make any changes. But the government found a document that permitted the construction and simply hanged the official who signed the permit. Right on that house. The official was hanged, but the house was not demolished. The dangling corpse was meant to convince the other officials to uphold the law. Did they stop taking bribes? No. They just became better at covering their tracks.

Corruption is characteristic of hired bureaucrats. A leader who is not a hired official has no interest in corruption. They will earn their income from honest and transparent business practices (taxes for kings or shareholder profits for capitalists), and corruption will primarily rob them. This is why corruption was not typical of feudal lords as a ruling class.

Whether a hired official is appointed as a lord (king or someone else) or elected from the people, he must somehow justify his existence, or, in the terms of modern economics, “create added value.”

If an official is appointed by the king or a higher-ranking official, he is generally not accountable to the people he is supposed to govern or the problems he is meant to solve—he is alienated from them. His added value is created through the control of the entrusted territory and the increase of tax revenues. In such a situation, he will do everything to secure additional income for himself, and corruption will thrive, not limited to the top echelons of power, since the elite is not interested in corruption and, importantly, possesses an unlimited repressive apparatus. Thus, the corrupt official’s task is to take, but not so much that information about his bribery reaches the very top. In large territories, where there existed a whole hierarchical ladder from the king down to minor officials, corruption could not help but flourish.

The added value of an elected official lies in providing the community with administrative or dispatcher A public official manages a common resource for the benefit of the community more effectively than a crowd. The official organizes the collection of opinions from the community on various issues and also implements the community’s directives. Ancient Greece and republican Rome are classic examples of such organization. However, a community of 10 people is not the same as a community of 1,000. Gathering opinions from a small group is much easier than from a large one. While it may be possible to reach a consensus among 10 people about who is most deserving, this becomes much more difficult among 1,000. Additionally, in larger groups, opportunism among members begins to emerge, where individuals not only intend to avoid funding or participating in the creation of public goods but may even shy away from the decision-making process altogether—thinking, “Let the smart people decide without me, and I’ll just go along with them.”

This leads to the idea of electing an administrator endowed with power, specifically a) for a fixed term, during which it is impossible or extremely difficult to remove them, and b) by a majority vote, but not by consensus or an “overwhelming majority.” It is believed that a delegate will not act against the interests of society, as they are a member of it themselves. In the context of ancient Greece, where delegates were chosen by lot and frequently replaced one another, people had reason to trust such a delegate. However, once a delegate gained a means of maintaining control for a sufficiently long period, their interests diverged from those of their electorate. The thesis that a delegate will enact fair laws or decisions because they would not want to harm themselves by living under the same laws or decisions no longer holds. The electoral system of power resembles a typical market transaction with asymmetric information. The true motives of a delegate in putting themselves forward for election and the actions of a delegate who has already taken office are unknown to the electorate. In such conditions, the dishonest delegate gains the advantage. All factors associated with transactions involving “cats in bags” are present both ex ante and ex post:

• Antiselection occurs when the more resources a candidate is willing to spend to obtain a position, or the easier the choice seems to the voter, the less likely the candidate is to behave honestly. Ultimately, bad candidates are likely to completely displace good ones in the electoral market.
• moral hazards, which consist in the fact that a delegate, once elected, may be inclined to breach the contract with voters, for example, by failing to fulfill campaign promises.

During the election stage, there is again a disconnect between the official and the community he is supposed to serve. Firstly, he has powers granted to him for a specific term, and it is difficult to revoke these powers due to laws written by the community itself. Secondly, the weight of an individual community member’s vote is diluted and insignificant. A specific person can be wronged and have their interests overlooked in favor of the “interests of society.” For example, in modern society, one local council member represents the interests of about 10,000 households. Is someone opposed? That’s their problem. There are still 9,999 families left.

At this stage, the opportunism of the community members comes into play once again. They shy away from voting and have no intention of going against the authorities or expressing protest. After all, a bureaucrat robs each person of a penny, while active protest actions, even if they don’t lead to any repressive consequences, cost much more. Nowadays, citizens are free to submit requests to the authorities and even participate in strikes and protests, but they simply can’t be bothered. They see no point in it.

It turns out that, theoretically, an elected official can deeply offend half of the electorate while only slightly rewarding the other half. In the next election, he will receive votes from 50% of the people, and his wife will add one more vote. The official will benefit from the margin, the difference between the monetary equivalent of the “offense” and the monetary equivalent of the “reward.” Interestingly, in the next term, he can offend the second group quite severely while not offending the first group, who have already been hurt. The first group will feel an “improvement” and vote for the official, while the opinions of the second group will no longer matter. By the third round… well, you get the idea. Elections eventually turn into a process not of appointing an official, but of legitimizing the power usurped by the official or the bureaucratic elite, even if the official does not use “administrative resources”—that is, the resources of society entrusted to him for management—in order to win the election.

Moreover, if the bureaucratic elite controls the media and propaganda, they can offend everyone. Some just a bit more than others, while telling on television that “others have it even worse” or that “there are enemies everywhere.”

The root of corruption lies in the alienation of officials from the people for whom they create “added value.” This alienation arises because it is extremely difficult to organize a large group of people to make rational everyday decisions on various issues. It’s simply unrealistic. Few people are competent on the matter. Even fewer will participate or consider a particular issue important. A permanent referendum is so costly and ineffective that society is willing to pay the price of corruption to avoid it.

 Who is to blame and what should be done?

Let’s create another committee/court/bureau that will be independent and investigate corruption! Great! Bees against honey.

It doesn’t work. For at least two reasons – first, it’s simply impossible to ensure the integrity of these people, especially in conditions of total corruption. It’s like trying to fix furniture with wooden patches while termites are still gnawing at it, or like pouring gasoline on a fire. The second reason is outlined above. All these bureaus and committees operate within the discourse of R*S=W, which, as shown above, is theoretically incapable of being productive. This is all just “treating” the symptoms, not the disease. The disease lies one level deeper.

Corruption is beneficial. For both the giver and the receiver of the bribe. The giver receives preferences that more than compensate for their investment in the bribe. The requester simply improves their life. If no one gives, no one will take. If it becomes advantageous to give, they will find a way to do it. Meanwhile, the person accepting the bribe is a rather passive participant in the event. They may be tempted by the opportunity to get rich, which is natural, or they may feel they have no other choice, or even that their life is at stake rather than just money. So, should we punish the givers of bribes? No, although one could come up with a solution (see Appendix). This would simply raise the stakes in the game, and there would still be a way to give that wouldn’t be considered a bribe and would evoke a sense of obligation in the receiver, which is natural and, in most cases, falls into the category of “good” rather than “evil.” No, since we punish for bribery, both parties should be held accountable. If we continue to believe in punishments or if we understand that it is practically impossible to convince society that punishments are irrational. By the way, if both should be punished, then the very act of transferring a bribe “taints” both participants, and they become bound by a circle of complicity. And punishing only the giver? That seems off as well. But if we find a way to suppress corruption, then punishments would disappear on their own due to the absence of crimes.

Bribing is not good, but people are made up of selfish individuals who try to gain their own benefits locally and at the expense of others. Each of us is a fare dodger on a tram, riding because others have paid for our ticket. If everyone collectively stops paying bribes to the traffic police, despite the intimidation and terror from the officers, the corrupt police will simply not want to continue working in “such terrible conditions,” and those who remain will be the ones who think of nothing but their salary.

But solidarity is only possible in a transparent and reputable society. In a society where everything is visible to everyone. A perfect example is climbers, firefighters, and special forces soldiers. One for all and all for one, that sort of thing. As soon as transparency disappears, so does solidarity. However, when we have more transparency, we also have transparent officials who are visible to everyone and find it difficult to accept bribes without being noticed. It’s also important to eliminate subjectivity. There should be clear rules and a well-functioning system. It should be an impersonal process, not something dependent on someone’s mood or laziness. By the way, the vagueness of the rules and the dysfunctionality of the system, along with the shortage of administrative services provided by officials, are the main motivators for “greasing the wheels” to get things done.

Functionality can be increased, and there is a demand for this in society, which is gradually being realized. “The state in a smartphone,” “electronic public services,” ProZorro, and other similar initiatives are designed to reduce the deficit in the provision of public services and streamline processes. The digitization of the state itself undermines the everyday grassroots corruption. But how can transparency be increased? The answer is: it can’t, given the current situation. After all, it is precisely the lack of transparency that serves as a tool for the authorities to exploit the population. Moreover, the state promotes this lack of transparency. All these movements, supposedly for the protection of “privacy,” are actually aimed at establishing not restrictions on interference in personal life, but a monopoly of power over such interference. In every such law, it is written, “no one can, but I can.” Even simple attempts to increase transparency, such as creating a registry of diabetes patients, are shut down under the pretext of protecting privacy, when in reality, such a registry is unnecessary for those who are raking in insane profits from insulin supplies. Who gets it, how much, when? No one knows. And this is a real case.

Or take the story about digitizing medical records. They say it can’t be done because of privacy concerns. But think about it: where is privacy better protected? When records are stored in a secure database with logged access, meaning you can’t make a request for more than one person at a time, and every request is recorded with details about who accessed it and when? Or when records are just sitting in cabinets, and literally anyone can make a copy of almost the entire file without leaving a trace? Not just anyone? Okay, that’s another point where corruption can arise. And let anyone have access to the database of medical records. The thing is, if the owner of a record finds out that someone who is not their treating physician has been digging through their documents without their knowledge or reason, they can report it to the police, who wouldn’t even need to investigate—it’s all logged. A robot could even send out the fine notice.

The main conclusion is that we shouldn’t fight against corruption, but rather create transparency and replace subjectivity with processes. Only then will there be no room for corruption. But how do we create transparency?

Well, I don’t want to publicly call for the violent overthrow of the current vampires. However, when those in power have completely gone off the rails, and everyone knows that official A is a thief, but no one intends to imprison him—in fact, whistleblowers are the ones being thrown in jail—the number of possible outcomes quickly dwindles.

Application

If we view the absence of corruption as a public good—something that everyone can use without limitation, regardless of who put in the effort to create it—it becomes clear that any attempt to offer a bribe is nothing more than a manifestation of the “free rider effect”—economically rational behavior when using a public good. “It’s not worth my while to dig a well if someone else is going to do it anyway.” Public goods are created either in solidarity groups (small, reputation-linked groups) or through the use of force, such as building roads and bridges funded by collected taxes. Thus, it becomes obvious and natural to demotivate and apply force against “free riders.”

When it comes to corruption, the problem is compounded by the fact that in the fight against corruption, the state is often unable to apply force in the right direction, as those in power are frequently not interested in combating corruption. But let’s assume there is interest. Then sanctions should be applied specifically to those who offer bribes, to the free riders. After this reasoning, it seems almost obvious. Moreover, applying sanctions to those who dictate the laws is nothing more than dreaming of pink unicorns. The laws do not apply to those in power. And if we still have some remnants of faith in the “rule of law,” we must somehow reconcile that faith with the existence of secret services, spies, and the military—people with a license for (illegal) killing. The authorities engage in the “rule of law” game solely for their own benefit, to maintain their own legitimacy—the people’s belief in the legality of their power. It is more advantageous to play the “rule of law” game than to fund a repressive apparatus. Moreover, the costs of repression further diminish legitimacy. It is more beneficial to publicly deal with a corrupt official once a year to appease the crowd than to purchase and maintain a couple of thousand armored vehicles for dispersing protests.

So, the framework of anti-corruption legislation might look like this:

• A government official is not punished for accepting a bribe, and the bribe remains entirely with him, provided that he reports the receipt of the bribe within 24 hours, specifying who gave it and for what purpose.
• A person who gives a bribe (whether an individual or a legal entity) a) simply loses that money and b) does not receive what they want. If it concerns obtaining licenses and permits, they lose that right altogether. The act of giving a bribe is made public in the community to which that person belongs, whether it be through an industry association, the residents of a building, a notice board in a hospital, and always, the employer.
• A person who has given a bribe may realize their wrongdoing and report the bribe within 24 hours. In this case, if the briber does not report the bribe, the individual receives compensation equal to double the amount of the bribe. If they do report it, they do not lose their rights to what is required. The procedure will proceed as normal, and there will be no publicity.
• If an official does not report receiving a bribe, but the bribe-giver does report it, then the official must pay a bonus to the bribe-giver and attend a two-week professional development course if they wish to continue working. This is not a “re-education camp.” These are real courses that teach officials how to serve the public, assist people in solving their problems, and deal with those who attempt to offer bribes. The main goal of such courses is to change the student’s mindset. Subsequent offenses, of course, result in a ban from holding office.

Under these rules of the game, it is advantageous for an official to immediately report a bribe-giver, as this allows them to gain all the desired benefits while staying within the law. The official also fears “undercover agents”—provocateurs who will try to exploit the official’s greed. Bribe-givers, under these rules, lose the ability to act in their own interest. Additionally, the lack of strict penalties does not raise the stakes in the game; instead, the system achieves its main goal—preventing the negative consequences of corruption. Toxic waste will not be buried on the grounds of a kindergarten, fraudsters will not receive a banking license, and the tax authorities will not turn a blind eye to shortcomings but will help correct them.

Of course, such legislation won’t eliminate all possible forms of corruption. (For example, when an official is a pre-appointed representative of the mafia.) However, it can significantly reduce the opportunities for a large number of behaviors that we classify as corrupt.

P.S. In Paris, it’s not the beggars who get fined, but those who give them money. And in the parks, it’s not the birds that are chased away, but those who feed them.