In his book “Guns, Germs, and Steel,” Jared Diamond points out in the chapter titled “From Egalitarianism to Kleptocracy”: “It should have become obvious that with leadership, a fundamental dilemma of all centrally governed, non-egalitarian societies first crystallized. At best, such societies do a good thing by providing costly services that individuals simply cannot organize for themselves. At worst, they function as kleptocracies, shamelessly redistributing the collective wealth of society in favor of the upper classes. These two functions, noble and selfish, are inextricably linked, although one is often expressed more strongly than the other. The difference between a kleptocrat and a wise ruler, between a robber baron and a public benefactor, is merely quantitative — it is a matter of what share of the tribute collected from producers the elite retains and whether the people are satisfied with how the remainder is redistributed for public needs.”
Thus, in one way or another, any power is kleptocratic to some extent. The level of kleptocracy that power can afford depends, as mentioned above, on the level of organizational costs that society must incur to displace that power, the presence of competitors capable of mobilizing small, covert groups, and, of course, the size of society. In small, transparent societies—such as tribes—the level of kleptocracy is minimal. In larger societies, governed by officials who maintain a monopoly on information, it can reach disproportionately high levels while still preserving a relative loyalty of the masses to the ruler.
D. Diamond pointed out four obvious things that a kleptocrat must do to maintain power:
- Disarm the population and arm the elite. Using the terminology described above, this means simultaneously increasing both the organizational costs for the group (which requires, at a minimum, secrecy) and the costs associated with obtaining the public good — the removal of the tyrant.
- Redistribute the collected tribute in such a way as to obtain a certain amount of public goods. Accordingly, reduce the costs to society from its existence. It is also worth noting that in conditions of a monopoly on information, a government can choose a certain segment of society that can be shamelessly exploited while simultaneously improving the welfare of another segment that is larger or more powerful than the first. In other words, it is sufficient for the ruler to reduce the costs of their existence not for the entire society, but for a selected majority (whether in terms of numbers or power).
- To establish an ideology or religion that would justify kleptocracy and reduce “information entropy” among the population, transforming it into a community of like-minded individuals willing to sacrifice themselves for a common goal. Before the advent of social networks, there was no other alternative path to homogenizing the worldview of the population. It is important to note that kleptocrats spend a significant portion of the collected tribute on religious or ideological support.
- To exercise the monopoly right to use force for the common good. Using the terminology described above, establish a system of coercion and selective incentives for the extraction of public goods for the chosen half of the population.
Having completed the first point in the initial stage, the kleptocrat is forced to pay attention to the remaining three. The stimulation of the kleptocrat’s activity in seeking new solutions is facilitated by the same informatization of group actions, which leads to a reduction in the group’s organizational costs. A group that has learned to write and maintain protocols for collective decision-making and to establish rules for such decisions is stronger than an illiterate group. A group that controls its own media is even stronger, and a group mobilized by social networks is stronger than all the previous ones. In other words, under modern conditions, an unarmed group incurs extremely minimal organizational costs and only deals with the costs associated with the production of public goods.
Then the kleptocrat addresses the second point. They regulate it until the robbed part of society has nothing left to lose except their chains, and the exploited part mobilizes to defend their rights, overcoming organizational costs or taking advantage of technological advancements that reduce those costs. This is what happened at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries with the development of the labor movement and organizations like the Comintern and the Socialist International.
The kleptocrat is left with two final points that directly depend on the process of redistributing the collected tribute, now without the possibility of plundering part of the population. While in the previous stage the kleptocrat addressed issues by redistributing the burden of tribute among the population, at this stage, the kleptocrat begins to spend the collected tribute. If the kleptocrat opts for the third point, which is clearly cheaper, they will build a powerful ideological machine or a totalitarian regime. We observed this phenomenon in the early to mid-20th century. However, this practice has limitations related to the gradual erosion of the kleptocrat’s monopoly on information, the development of independent media or those owned by competing parties, social networks, and the increasing demands of society for transparency in the ruler’s actions, which is reflected in the emergence of the concept of a “public figure.”
Finally, the implementation of the 4th point is expressed in creation an increasing number of goods that are characterized as public (for example, free or conditional education and healthcare, non-monetized benefits for students and pensioners). We can observe this process since the end of the 20th century, when a number of countries reached near ideals of socialism in their development. Today, the level of development of countries is characterized precisely by the diversity of socialized goods.
In this context, under conditions of information asymmetry between the authorities and the population, the public perceives certain social goods, such as good news, without considering that the more money is spent on public goods, the more ends up in the pockets of the kleptocrat, who has already lost all other means of maintaining power. Even the awareness of kleptocratic motives is rationalized by the population: “So what if the mayor’s son-in-law owns the factory…”